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I
INTRODUCTION

The question of the exercise of rights of navigation in the post-UNCLOS III
environment subsumes one of the most complex sets of issues relating to the law of
the sea that could be addressed today under existing circumstances. As is well
known, the United States and three other countries voted against the adoption of
the Law of the Sea Treaty on April 30, 1982.1 Since that time, Argentina has
announced that it will not sign the Treaty, 2 and other countries are in the process
of evaluating the Treaty in the light of their own national interests. Such circumstances complicate any analysis of navigation rights and call for an examination of
two interrelated questions.
First, one must examine the Treaty provisions themselves to ascertain what the
Treaty drafters intended with respect to the relative rights of coastal states and
other states with respect to navigation-related issues. Before one can seek to understand the state of the law in this confused situation, that is, whether the Treaty
provisions have any independent life of their own, it is critical to undertake a
proper reading of them. The second question, when the analysis is complete, is
one of the relationship of those texts to the rights and duties of those states which
may not become parties to the Convention.
Some observers are already attaching considerable significance to the provisions of the Treaty, whether the Convention enters into force or not. Some are
even of the view that the nonseabeds provisions of the texts already reflect norms
of customary international law. For example, the introductory note to the American Law Institute's Restatement of/he Foreign Relatons Law of the United States, tentative draft 3, states: "Except with respect to Part XI of the Draft Convention, this
Restatement, in general, accepts the Draft Convention as codifying the customary
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1. The treaty was adopted by a vote of 130 for to 4 against, with 17 abstentions. The four opposed
were Israel, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. All rejected for different reasons. The United
States voted against because the deep seabed mining part of the Convention did not meet stated U.S.
negotiating objectives. For the President's views on this point, see 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887,
887-88 (July 9, 1982). Among the abstentions were members of the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union has
since announced that it intends to sign the treaty, and presumably the rest of the bloc will follow suit.
2. Statement by Argentina on Sept. 24, 1982, in Plenary session at UN Headquarters, New York. The
principal reason given was Argentina's objection to Resolution III of the Conference, part of which relates
to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute.
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international law of the sea, and as law of the United States."' 3 While this is a view
held by some prominent U.S. lawyers, experts from other countries have also
expressed similar views, though they do not go quite so far. A recent International
Law Association report, for example, puts it this way:
In order to form a new rule of customary international law state practice should,
according to traditional viewpoints, be "both extensive and virtually uniform," and in
accordance with opinio juris, i.e., showing a "general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved .... ." The principles worked out by UNCLOS III can constitute, at
least potentially, a major factor in the creation of an extremely important new body of law
4

With respect to the economic zone in particluar, they said:
The rules elaborated by the Conference. . . have influenced the process of creating new
legal regimes established by coastal state
promulgations. It may be said that UNCLOS III
5
has initiated this law-creating process.

This particular line of thinking bestows an importance on the UNCLOS texts that
transcends the actual Treaty itself.
For that reason, let us look at some of the key provisions. With regard to navigation rights, the Treaty establishes certain zones of jurisdiction and some special
regimes such as those for international straits and archipelagos. It also sets the
framework for fishing rights, for the preservation of the marine environment, and
for marine scientific research. Obviously, the manner in which these activities are
conducted or regulated has clear implications for the exercise of navigation; thus
they need to be understood. But first this article discusses the major direct areas of
concern.
II
THE TERRITORIAL SEA

The first and second Law of the Sea Conferences 6 failed to deal successfully
with the question of the breadth of the territorial sea, and, as a result, new, conflicting claims to extended national jurisdiction abounded. 7 As a result of this new
threat, in 1965 the Soviet Union initiated certain overtures with several maritime
states aimed at containing expansive claims to broad terrritorial seas., These factors were prime motivating forces leading to the convening of the Third United
3.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, introductory note

to pt. V, at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982).
4.
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EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 3 (1982).
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6. The references are to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention] and
the records of the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 19/8
(1960). For an excellent history of claims relating to the breadth of the territorial sea and of the two
United Nations conferences, see 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. IX, § 2 (1965).

7. According to information published by the geographer of the U.S. Department of State, by 1981,
105 states claimed territorial seas of 12 or more miles. Fourteen of these claimed 200 nautical mile limits.
See 36 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS 8 (1982).

8. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 174 (1981). The Soviet approach
was confirmed by Professor Bernard H. Oxman, who at that time, while representing the U.S. Defense
Deoartment, participated in the discussions.
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Nations Law of the Sea Conference in 1973. 9 Participants in this conference were
able, as a part of a global package deal, to agree on an outer territorial sea limit of
twelve nautical miles. 10 This agreement was achieved only upon the condition
that other problems associated with the breadth of the territorial sea would simultaneously be resolved. The first of these other problems was the question of coastal
state jurisdiction over fisheries in waters adjacent to their coasts. This problem
was critical because the primary reason for the failure of the 1958 and 1960 Law of
the Sea Conferences to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea was
that the traditional concepts of the territorial sea and the high seas were inadequate to accommodate the legitimate interests of coastal states with respect to the
management of resources in adjacent areas." To solve this particular problem the
concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone was developed.
A second important element of the package deal involved passage through
international straits. By increasing the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles,
many straits that had previously been considered as part of the high seas would fall
within the territorial sea of one or more coastal states.' 2 This prospect raised concerns for the major maritime powers. It was understood at the outset that both of
these difficulties would have to be resolved before either the coastal states or the
maritime states would be willing to accept the twelve-mile limit in the Treaty.
As in the 1958 Convention, the Treaty confirms that coastal states have sovereignty over the territorial sea, subject to the right of innocent passage. '3 The definition of innocent passage in the new text is the same as that contained in the 1958
Geneva Convention. This term is defined as that which is "not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal state."1 4 What has been added, however, is a specific list of twelve activities which, if engaged in by ships in the territorial sea, would be considered prejudicial, thus elaborating in some detail upon the
9. The Conference was convened by a decision of the General Assembly contained in G.A. Res. 2750C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8273 (1970). It was preceded, of course by several
years of preparatory work in the ad hoc committee to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean
floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (known as the Seabed Committee). This committee was
established by G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. DOC. A/6964 (1967). The committee
was subsequently expanded and made a standing committee. For a brief history of the work of that committee, see generally, KNIGHT, THE LAw OF THE SEA: CASEs, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS, ch. 10 (1980):
A. HOLLICK, supra note 8, ch. 8.
10. Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor stgnature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122
(1982), art. 3 [hereinafter cited as Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
11. The history of the evolution of the territorial sea concept is, with respect to questions of its
breadth, reflective of the tension between maritime and coastal states. The issue was always the conflict
between resource management and freedom of navigation. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 6,ch. IX.
12. The number of such straits is not clear. The number frequently heard is 116. See A. HOLLICK,
supra note 8, at 235. A chart prepared by the geographer of the U.S. Department of State shows 121.
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, WORLD STRAITS AFFECTED BY A 12 MILE TERRITORIAL SEA (1977). OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTFX OF THE SE-A 22-27
(1969) lists 94 straits between seven and twenty-four miles. For a description of the traffic in some of the
major straits, see Hodgson & McIntyre, Martzine Commerce
OF MARITIME TRANSIT 1 (1973).

13.
14.

in

Selected Areas ofHtgh Concentration, in HAZARDS

Compare Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 1, 14-23 with Convention, supra note 10, art. 2(3).
Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 14(4); Convention, supra note 10, art- 19(1).
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basic concept.15 Article 21 of the new text also more clearly indicates the specific
kinds of laws and regulations that could be enacted with respect to innocent passage.1 6 Some concern has been voiced that the new Treaty provisions, and in particular Article 19(2)(a), actually broaden coastal state discretion to deny the rights
of innocent passage because of the reference to violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.' 7 This author, however, does not adhere to that view. The reference to the Charter is clearly linked to
threats or use of force against the coastal state, and no one in the Conference questioned that limitation.
The history of the doctrine of innocent passage indicates that doctrinal thinking has now gone full cycle. The report of the Second Commission (Territorial
Sea) of the 1930 Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of International Law contained the following article on the "Right of Passage": "Passage is
not innocent when a vessel makes use of the territorial sea of a coastal state for the
purpose of doing any act prejudicial to the security, to the public policy or to the
fiscal interests of that State."' 18 One should note that the emphasis there was upon
the purpose of the vessel in doing any prejudicial act, while the 1958 definition
seems to focus more upon the effects upon the coastal state. In 1958, the United
States took the position that prejudicial acts should be restricted to security matters alone and that these matters were purely military and not related to eco15. Convention, supra note 10, art. 19(2) reads as follows:
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution, contrary to this Convention
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
16. Id. art. 21 lists the following categories with respect to which a coastal state may adopt laws and
regulations:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution thereof,
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
of the coastal State.
17. See, e.g., Reisman, The Regune of Straits and NAatonal Security." An Appraisal of International Lawmaking,

74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 48, 62 (1980).
18. 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 6, at 353.
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nomics or ideology.' 9 On the other hand, eight Latin American powers suggested
that passage should be considered noninnocent if it affected the interests of the
coastal state. 20 Both of these positions were rejected in favor of the final version
which was proposed by India. The difference of views focused upon the scope of
activities that should be taken into account, but in the process, the emphasis
placed upon "acts" by the Hague Conference was lost, perhaps inadvertently. The
new text restores that emphasis. Each of the items listed in Article 19 describes an
act, which if performed in the territorial sea, affects the status of the vessel. It
seems clear, then, that the article was drafted to reflect an intention to restrict the
coastal state to the prevention of specific acts, and therefore not to give it the
broad discretion feared by some. This is supported by the provision of Article 21
which clarifies those areas in which the coastal state has legislative competence
relating to innocent passage. All of these changes in the new Treaty give the Convention greater clarity, but they do not change in any way the basic principle from
that which was previously understood. The new texts protect the right of innocent
passage while making clear the rules that can be applied with respect to how that
right may be exercised.
An example will illustrate this assertion. Article 19 lists as prejudicial "any act
of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention." Article 21 permits the
coastal state to adopt laws and regulations in respect to "the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution" even if not willful and serious. On the other hand,
Article 24 specifies that the coastal state shall not hamper innocent passage, and it
shall not impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the right of innocent passage, nor shall it discriminate in
form or in fact against the ships of any state "or against ships carrying cargoes to,
from or on behalf of any State." Article 211(4) states that while laws may be
adopted and applied with respect to pollution in the territorial sea, they shall not
"hamper innocent passage." The conclusion to be drawn from these restrictions is
that the coastal state rules cannot impinge upon the basic right of innocent passage itself. Further evidence of the intent to protect navigation interests can be
found in Article 21, which provides that laws and regulations of coastal states
cannot apply to the design, construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships
unless they give effect to generally accepted international rules and standards.
As before, the new Treaty permits a coastal state to suspend, temporarily,
without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, innocent passage for
security reasons. 2 I Article 25(3) of the new Treaty, unlike the 1958 Geneva Convention, includes the right of suspension of passage in cases involving the exercise
of weapons. While this at first may seem to broaden coastal state powers, it
becomes understandable in light of the fact that the addition was made at the
request of the delegation of Belgium, which wished to have a clear statement that
temporary suspension was authorized if a coastal state wished to close off a zone
19.
20.
21.

See M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE
Id
Convention, supra note 10, art. 25(3).

PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS

251-52 (1962).
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for the exercise of shore batteries. 22 Since this right had never been disputed in the
past, the change was not viewed as an alteration of existing norms, and it was thus
acceptable to the maritime powers.
It is also necessary to say a word about innocent passage of warships under the
Treaty, an issue which received considerable attention during the course of the
Conference. Many delegations were engaged on both sides of this issue during the
general debates. 23 All the debates proved was that there was no middle ground
between the antagonists.2 4 For that reason, no accommodation of views was possible through the medium of negotiation. In the closing days of the Conference,
Gabon offered a formal amendment to Article 21 to allow coastal states to require
prior authorization or notification for passage of warships through the territorial
sea. 25 This proposal, of course, was tenaciously opposed by the maritime states,
and, in the end, the amendment was withdrawn (partially in response to a plea by
the Conference President for the withdrawal of all formal amendments to better
enhance consensus) in favor of a proposal to add a reference to "security" to the
provision in Article 21(1)(h), which gives coastal states the authority to enact laws
regarding customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary measures. 2" To permit a
coastal state to enact laws preventing infringement of security regulations would
give such states extremely broad regulatory powers in the territorial sea-not necessarily limited even to warships. This proposal was even more strongly resisted. It
therefore appeared imminent that the issue would go to a vote in the plenary. At
the last minute, however, the sponsors of the proposal agreed to withdraw it in
favor of a statement by the President of the Conference, on the record, that its
withdrawal was "without prejudice to the rights of coastal states to adopt measures
to safeguard their security interests, in accordance with articles 19 and 25 of this
Convention. '27 Since those articles had already been accepted as governing the
rights of coastal states, 28 it cannot be said that the President's statement does more
than restate the obvious. Accordingly, the traditional view of the maritime states
that warships, like other ships, are entitled to a right of innocent passage in the
territorial is still the law of the sea.
22. This proposal was made at the Conference in an informal session of the Second Committee, and
the solution was negotiated privately. The statement is based on the author's notes and participation in
the negotiations.
23. The basic split, of course, was between the maritime powers and the coastal states and their supporters. The debates took place in Committee Two on several occasions, as well as in small groups chaired
by Ambassador Aguilar, chairman of the Second Committee. While the opponents of innocent passage for
warships appeared at times to outnumber the maritimes, they were in fact split among themselves. A final
attempt was made by Ambassador Aguilar to achieve a negotiated solution during the final week of the
substantive negotiations, without avail.
24. At one point, the opponents of innocent passage for warships offered to settle for prior notification
only, but this was seen by the maritimes as no different from requiring authorization.
25. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.97 (1982).
26. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L. 117 (1982).
27. This statement was made by President T.T.B. Koh in plenary session on April 24, 1982. U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 61/SR.176 (1982).
28. For security-related provisions of article 19, seesupra note 15. Article 25 refers to the right of a
coastal state to suspend innocent passage for the protection of its security.
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In sum, aside from the new straits regime, nothing occurred at the Law of the
Sea Conference to change the regime of the territorial sea except to broaden its
geographic application and to spell out more clearly the specific obligations and
rules regarding innocent passage in a manner that accurately reflects the underlying balancing theory intended under the 1958 Geneva Convention.
III
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Much energy was fruitlessly expended during the Conference arguing about
the "legal status" of the proposed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). During these
debates, the zone was variously referred to as "high seas," a "zone of national
jurisdiction," or a zone suigeneris in nature. 29 While such debates were interesting,
they added little to the development of a rational legal framework for activities in
the zone. Once the polemics died down, the focus shifted to negotiation of specific
rights and duties, that is, to a functional approach to the problem rather than a
definitional characterization. The cornerstone of the resulting economic zone
package is found in two articles, 56 and 58, although many other provisions in the
Treaty are made relevant through the use of cross-references and placement in the
chapter.
Article 5630 deals with the rights and duties of coastal states in the economic
zone. Paragraph 1(a) of the article establishes sovereign rights for the coastal state
for the exploration and exploitation of living and nonliving resources of the zone
and for other economic activities such as the production of energy. This particular
paragraph makes two points eminently clear: (1) the rights of the coastal state are
economic in nature, having to do with resources and resource-related subjects; and
(2) these economic rights are exclusive to the coastal state. Paragraph l(b) also
contains a general reference to coastal states' rights, but these rights, unlike those
in 1(a), are not established by Article 56 itself. The rights that exist are established
elsewhere and drawn into Article 56 by cross-reference. For this reason their scope
is not merely qualified but is defined by provisions of other parts of the Conven29. The maritime states, obviously, preferred "high seas" while coastal states referred to "national
jurisdiction." Chairman Aguilar, of the Second Committee, said in his Introductory Note to the Revised
Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Part II (1976). "Nor is there anv doubt
that the exclusive economic zone is neither the high seas nor the territorial sea. It is a zone suIgenert
g
s..
30. Convention, supra note 10, art. 56 reads as follows:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds:
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures:
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic
zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be exercised in
accordance with Part VI.
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tion, particularly, but not exclusively, those dealing with the protection of the
marine environment 3' and marine scientific resarch. 32 This is also true with
respect to the establishment and control over artificial islands, installations, and
structures. 33 Paragraph l(c) is also important to an overall understanding of the
function of the article. It restricts what coastal states may do in the economic zone
by reference to "other rights and duties provided for in the Convention," which
34
gives coastal states duties relating to conservation and the environment.
In juxtaposition with Article 56, Article 58 refers to the rights and freedoms of
other states in the EEZ. 35 The basic rights, unqualified in nature, are the freedoms
of navigation and overflight referred to in Article 87 and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, which are therefore qualitatively the same as when they
are exercised in the area seaward of the zone. Not all of Article 58, however, is
unqualified. For example, the article also provides for "other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to" the basic freedoms "such as those associated with
the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines" so long as they
are exercised in a manner that is "compatible with the other provisions of this
Convention." Articles 88 to 115 are referred to in paragraph 2 as applying in the
EEZ "insofar as they are not incompatible with" the provisions contained in the
economic zone chapter. This compatibility requirement is beneficial because it
provides necessary balance. Obviously, some of the high seas rights referred to in
Articles 88 to 115 can be applied in the economic zone as written without raising
any question whatsoever about compatibility. Provisions concerning piracy,'"6 the
nationality of ships, 37 or the proscription against subjecting any part of the high
seas to sovereignty 38 are universal and pose no problem. Other provisions, however, if applied strictly could pose a complete or partial incompatibility problem.
An example of such a provision is Article 110, which sets out the circumstances
under which vessels may be approached and boarded when on the high seas.39 The
31. See id pt. XII.
32. See id. pt. XIII.
33. See id art. 60.
34. See, for example, the conservation requirements of article 61, with respect to fishing.
35. Convention, supra note 10, art. 58 reads as follows:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the
sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply
with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
36. See id. arts. 100-07.
37. See id. arts. 91-93.
38. See id. art. 89.
39. Article 110 limits high seas boarding, except when otherwise provided by treaty, to cases involving
piracy, the slave trade, and unauthorized broadcasting. Boarding can also be carried out where the ship
being boarded is without nationality or where it either flies a foreign flag or refuses to show a flag but is in
reality a ship of the same nationality as the warship.
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economic zone chapter, however, provides for additional boarding rights, such as
for fisheries enforcement. 40 The compatibility requirement of Article 58 simply
assures that these specifically stated coastal state rights in the zone cannot be
reduced by the application of the high seas articles, which do not refer to fisheries
enforcement.
Article 58(3) provides that a state exercising its rights in the economic zone
must comply with laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state in accordance
with the Convention. This, of course, is a further restriction, but it is not a limitation on the rights specified in Article 58 but only a limitation upon the manner in
which those rights are to be exercised. For example, Article 211(5) permits the
coastal state to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution in the EEZ. Enforcement of those laws, however, is circumscribed
to specific circumstances. For instance, Article 220 limits port state enforcement to
cases involving major damage or threats of major damage, and Article 218 limits
enforcement for violations in the economic zone to the occasion when a vessel is
voluntarily within a port or at an offshore terminal. In addition, section 7 of Part
XII of the Convention provides for a number of additional safeguards such as the
requirement that states, in exercising their rights with respect to pollution, shall
not discriminate among vessels and that only monetary penalties may be imposed
for violations. As a whole, the pollution rules in the Convention place a premium
upon the viability of navigation within the economic zone, yet allow reasonable
protection to the coastal state.
Let us return briefly to the phrase in Article 58, "and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines," '4' to explore its
presence and meaning. This is language foreign to the 1958 Geneva Conventions
which, of course, were void of the concept of the EEZ. As Article 58 makes clear,
Article 87 is not incorporated by reference. There are several reasons why this is
so. First, Article 87 specifying the high seas freedoms makes reference to some uses
42
which are clearly incompatible with coastal state rights in the economic zone.
The most obvious of these is fishing, which falls under coastal state management
and is not a freedom to be exercised in the zone. 4 3 In addition, the listing of free40.

41.
42.
I.

See Convention, supra note 10, art. 73.
See supra note 35.
Convention, supra note 10, art. 87 reads as follows:

The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law.
It comprises, inter a/ia, both for coastal and land-locked states:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international
law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(0 freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
43. Id arts. 56, 61-62.
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doms in Article 87 is not exclusive. This is made clear by the use of the phrase in/er
aba when those rights are listed. To incorporate that phrase by reference into
Article 58 would broaden the freedoms in the zone beyond a limit that coastal
states were willing to accept. On the other hand, a simple reference in Article 58
to the freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, without more, was seen as presenting the possibility of a restrictive
reading of the article to permit those freedoms and those freedoms only. There
may be a touch of paranoia in this view because a legitimate argument can be
made that the term "freedom of navigation" is a term of art adopted from the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 4 4 and has the same content as when
used there. Nevertheless, the phrase in question was added 4 5 to make clear that
while coastal states were entitled to any unspecified residual rights in connection
with resource exploitation, other states could exercise any unspecified residual
rights associated with the basic freedoms specified.
Other provisions of the Convention have an obvious bearing on the conduct of
navigation in the economic zone. Article 60, for example, deals with the emplacement of artificial islands, installations, and structures in the zone. It provides, inter
a/ia, for the establishment by the coastal state of reasonable safety zones which
vessels in navigation must respect. 46 But it also requires that installations or structures which have been abandoned or fallen into disuse be removed "to ensure
safety of navigation. '4 7 This is a modification of the 1958 rule which required
such structures to be "entirely removed, ' 48 providing a better balance by referring
the question of removal standards to the appropriate international organization
(in this case, the International Maritime Organization). The fisheries provisions
contained in Articles 61 to 73 also impact on the conduct of navigation. The very
act of fishing, taking into account the gear and procedures used, constitutes a
potential conflict with the exercise of navigation rights by nonfishing vessels. The
same can clearly be true of the conduct of marine scientific research. These potential conflicts are in part alleviated by several additional articles. In the first
instance, if the dispute concerns whether a particular use of the economic zone, not
identified or specified in the Convention, falls within the jurisdiction of the coastal
state or is a right which can be exercised by other states, Article 59 gives guidance.
49
That article sets forth considerations to be taken into account in such situations.
44. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S, No. 5200. 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
45. The negotiation of this article took place in informal consultations of a group of interested states
on both sides of the issue chaired by Ambassador Jorge Castaneda, head of the Mexican delegation and
now Foreign Minister of Mexico. He was assisted in this task by Ambassador Helga Vindcnes of Norway.
For an interesting insight into this negotiation, see Brennan, Jurisdiction of Coastal States and Other States
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (unpublished manuscript presented before the Seventh International
Ocean Symposium of the Ocean Association of Japan, Oct. 21-22, 1982).
46. Convention, supra note 10, arts. 60(4)-(7).
47. Id art. 60(3).
48. 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(5), 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
499 U.N.T.S. 311.
49. Convention, supra note 10, art. 59 reads as follows:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the
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Furthermore, Article 300 must be kept in mind; it requires that rights, jurisdictions, and freedoms must be exercised in a manner which would not constitute an
"abuse of right." Finally, Article 297 requires submission of disputes to compulsory
settlement when it is alleged that a coastal state has acted in contravention of the
Convention in regard to the freedoms and associated rights specified in Article 58.
In the light of the Treaty's overall complexity, the foregoing is an admittedly
sketchy view of the EEZ provisions and their meaning. It should, however, serve
to illustrate the proper balance and provide perspective on the subject.
IV
INTERNATIONAL STRAITS

These provisions are among the more complex rules of the Treaty, and because
they have been analyzed in great detail elsewhere, this article addresses only the
most important and fundamental questions. The articles by professors Moore and
Reisman in the January 1980 issue of the Americanjournalof InternationalLaw 5t) are
particularly enlightening. The basic question examined in these two articles is
whether the Treaty provisions do or do not provide as much maritime mobility,
including submerged transit, through straits as does the extant regime for international straits. Put differently, does the Treaty regime accurately reflect the present
state of understanding of nations with regard to navigation through straits as
reflected in traditional practices of maritime states in those areas? Reisman argues
the negative side of the question, while Moore takes the opposite view. This
author agrees with the affirmative view. A few of the reasons follow.
First, unlike the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, the new
Treaty makes it crystal clear that aircraft in overflight are included in the concept
of "transit passage." This is reflected in several places, such as in Article 38(2)
which, while defining transit passage, refers to the "freedom of navigation and
overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the
strait."
The right of submerged transit is not so directly addressed, but is no less clear.
Reisman is not so sure. He argues there is an ambiguity in the words "normal
modes" as they are used in Article 39(1)(c). -" He says:
Mode of transit of different vessels is,in part, a factual question, but it also has normative
and contextual components, for what is "normal" will depend on context, including the
legal environment. It is neither implausible nor inconsistent with other [Treaty] provisions

coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in
the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
50.

Moore, The Regime of Stratis and the Third United Mattons Conference on the Laie o/'the Sea, 74 At. J.

INT'.. L. 77 (1980); Reisman, supra note 17.
51. Convention, supra note 10, art. 39(1)(c) provides:
I. Ships and aircraft while exercising the right of transit passage shall:
(c) refrain from an), activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and
expeditious transit unless rendered necessary byjrce majeire or by distress ....
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to assume that both the coastal and the flag
state will participate in determining "nor52
mality" for vessels transiting coastal waters.

To this, Moore responds that Article 39(2) uses the term of art, previously alluded
4
to in this article, 53 "freedom of navigation," when referring to transit passage.
That term is used in Article 87 with respect to the high seas and was taken from
Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. This term was intentionally selected by
the negotiators for use in the straits chapter for that very reason. All of the participants in the negotiations were sophisticated and fully aware of the implications of
the use of this phrase, and, certainly no one has ever seriously argued that
"freedom of navigation" in the 1958 Geneva Convention was ever meant to
exclude submerged transit. These same participants were never in doubt with
regard to the meaning of the words "normal modes" for it was made clear on
several occasions by the maritime states. 55 Some have asked why, if submerged
transit were meant, the texts do not specifically say so. Moore has answered this
question by pointing out that if "freedom of navigation" as used in Article 38(2)
were further expanded, that could create a negative implication in other articles,
such as Article 87, where that term is used without qualification. -56 It was too late
at the time the straits articles were negotiated to make corresponding changes in
other articles, to say nothing of the implications for the use of the phrase in the
1958 Geneva Convention. It could also be noted, in this connection, that there is
no reference to submerged transit in Article 58, yet no one is arguing that submerged transit cannot be undertaken in the EEZ.
Reisman also seems to feel that the limitations placed upon vessels in their
exercise of the right of transit passage makes the straits regime more similar to the
regime of innocent passage than to the regime of the high seas. 57 This author
cannot agree. The two chapters are entirely different. The specific duties of the
flag state and the rights of the littoral states describe the manner in which transit
passage should be exercised, but the basic right itself is not related. 58 Furthermore,
it is significant that the provisions for innocent passage and those for transit passage have been carefully and deliberately separated in the Treaty. 59 Only those
provisions in the straits chapter, such as Article 45, where specific reference is
made to innocent passage, can be said to be linked.
Questions have also been raised regarding the certainty of transit passage
under the Treaty. Article 38 sets out the right of transit passage; Article 39 specifies the duties of vessels engaged in such passage. One should carefully note that
the manner in which the rights and duties are set out varies completely from the
way innocent passage is handled. Article 19 is structured so that a violation of any
of the activities listed therein removes a vessel from innocent status and subjects it
52. Reisman, supra note 17, at 71.
53. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
54. Moore, supra note 50, at 96.
55. See id at 100-02.
56. Id at 98.
57. Reisman, supra note 17, at 70.
58. Articles 39 and 40 refer to duties of ships and aircraft. The rights of coastal states are for the most
part contained in Articles 41 and 42.
59. The innocent passage provisions appear in part II, section 3, subsection A, while the rules for
straits are found in part I1, a separate chapter.
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to the right of the coastal state to take steps to prevent its passage. 60 The duties
specified in Article 39, on the other hand, if violated, only entail international
liability under the Convention 6 and do not give rise to a coastal state right of
action. Furthermore, the laws of coastal states under Article 42 are carefully circumscribed to four specific categories. The first two-safety of navigation and the
prevention of pollution-limit actions taken by the coastal state to those acts consistent with internationally approved standards. The others-relating to fishing
and violations of customs, fiscal, and immigration laws-are subject to the general
requirement that laws enacted with respect thereto must not hamper transit passage nor discriminate among foreign ships. 6 2 These latter provisions clearly relate
to activities outside the scope of continuous and expeditious passage of a strait and,
therefore, should cause no problem. Finally, one should note that warships are
immune from the enforcement of such regulations, 63 and they also are not subject
to pollution regulations. 64 The conclusion that must be reached is that the rights
and duties of ships in transit passage are independent and unrelated.
V
ARCHIPELAGIC SEALANES PASSAGE

At this point, little needs to be said on the subject of archipelagic sealanes
passage. Obviously, the archipelago concept had been around for some period of
time or else it would not have been the subject of negotiations at the Conference.
Certain states argued that their sovereignty should not be fractionated by the geographical accident that separated segments of their society on islands rather than
on a continent. To permit states in this condition to create an envelope of sovereignty encompassing their outer boundaries, however, would create enormous
areas under their control that had previously been considered high seas. Yet there
was an element of rationality in the desire of these groups of islands to integrate
themselves politically and economically under the protection of international law.
It was for this reason that the chapter on archipelagos was promulgated.
Insofar as the articles 6 5 themselves are concerned, no serious questions with
respect to their meaning or effect have been raised. While Article 49 bestows upon
the archipelagic state sovereignty extending to the air space above the archipelago
as well as to the seabed and subsoil, that sovereignty must be exercised subject to
the other provisions of Part IV of the Convention. It is these other provisions that
protect the interests of the maritime powers. The concept of archipelagic sealanes
passage guarantees transit through the archipelago in the same way that transit
passage protects navigation through straits. The archipelagic state may designate
special sealanes through which ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Convention, supra note 10, art. 25(1).
Id art. 31.
Id art. 24.
Id art. 95.
Id art. 236, mistakenly headed "Sovereign immunity." It is actually an exception.
See id pt. IV.
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sealanes passage, defined as navigation and overflight in the normal mode. 66 If the
state fails to designate such lanes, or if not all normal routes are designated, then,
in accordance with Article 53(12), the right of archipelagic sealanes passage
extends to all routes normally used for international navigation and overflight.
With respect to the duties of ships and the duties of the archipelagic state, Articles
39, 40, 42, and 44 of the straits chapter are specifically applicable. 67 To the extent
that the operative parts of these provisions have been discussed in the preceding
section, they need not be referred to again here. Outside of sealanes, the regime of
innocent passage applies. 68 This chapter, taken together with the chapter on
straits, establishes a pattern that reinforces the general conclusion that these are
special regimes designed to enshrine the practices of maritime states which were
recognized patterns of activity in these special areas prior to the initiation of the
Law of the Sea Conference. If this were not so, this author does not believe that
these maritime states would ever have agreed to accept the archipelagic principle
in the Treaty.
VI
NONPARTIES

This article now turns to the second question: the effect of the Treaty upon
(and its relation to) nonparties to the Law of the Sea Convention.
At the concluding plenary of the Conference in September, the delegate of
Peru stated, on the record, that no rights could accrue to states not parties to the
Convention. To that the United States representative replied that it was legally
untenable to argue that no rights described in the Treaty inured to nonparties.
The Peruvian remark reflects arguments that rights in the Treaty are contractual
in nature, that they are not customary international law, and that states have no
right to "pick and choose" among the various provisions of the Convention,
electing to abide by those they consider beneficial while rejecting the rest. All such
statements miss the mark of reality. From the quotations presented at the opening
of this essay, 69 one can see that there is a view growing among international lawyers, both domestic and foreign, that the nonmining provisions of the Treaty are
either customary international law, the best evidence of international law, or, at
the very least, a pattern of understanding reflecting the foundation upon which
customary law will undoubtedly develop. 70 The tentative draft of the Restatement elaborates on this view as follows:
Many of the provisions of the Draft
sions in the 1958 Conventions which
restated customary law accepted by
Draft Convention that deviate from,

Convention repeat, with minor modifications, provithe United States had ratified and which very largely
states generally. Also, most of the provisions of the
or add to, the 1958 Conventions were accepted at the

66. Id art. 53(1).
67. Id art. 54.
68. Id art. 52.
69. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
70. For another view, see C. Oliver, The Rule of Law at Sea-Uncustomary International Law
(unpublished manuscript presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the Section of International Law,
American Bar Association).
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Conference, after hard negotiations, by consensus, and many of these provisions have influenced and reflect the practice of states. The United States and other states generally regard
the provisions of the Draft Convention, with the exception of Part
XI relating to seabed
71
mining, as authoritative statements of existing international law.

Because of that belief, the drafters of the Restatement incorporated many of the
principles of the Treaty, including, inter ahba, those relating to straits and archipelagos. 72 The Part XI mining provisions can and should be differentiated, as the
Institute has done, since much of that part is institution-creating, and custom plays
no role in that process. The view that the other provisions should be seen as
existing law has a sound policy base.
First, the consensus negotiations during the Conference have, over the years,
produced two identifiable consequences: (1) several states have already taken the
necessary steps, by legislation, decree, or other internal process, to give effect to
provisions of the Treaty bearing upon fishing, the continental shelf, and other matters; 73 and (2) a vast number of participating delegations in the Conference came
away from the Conference firmly convinced that what they had created, other
than institutional provisions, was in fact representative of their view of international law. Such international expectations are important and must now be kept
clearly in the forefront of considerations involved in contemporary decisionmaking. To reverse or undercut such expectations, particularly with respect to
navigation issues, even for what some may see as the beneficial object of pressuring
states outside of the Treaty to accept the mining provisions, would be short-sighted
and conflict-producing.7 4 Some contenders have even gone so far as to suggest
that the Law of the Sea Convention represents a scrapping of the 1958 Geneva
Conventions. 75 Such a proposition is both wrong and dangerous. The Law of the
Sea Convention itself provides that it prevails, as between states parties, over the
1958 Geneva Conventions. 76 While that applies to the law between parties, it is a
far cry from saying that the earlier conventions are not alive to regulate at least
some activities as between nonparties. In fact, the implication is just the opposite.
Furthermore, it is contrary to the understanding of the participants with respect to
71.

RESTATEMENTr, supra note 3, at 55.

Id. at 56, § 513.
73. The United States, itself, has done so. See, e.g., Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codifiedasamendedin scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
74. See generally M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 19, particularly at page 12, where the
authors speak of the "provincial myopia."
72.

75.

Several statements to this effect were made at the final session of the Conference at Montego Bay.

Exemplary is the following excerpt from the remarks of Paul Engo (Cameroons):
[T]he Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was not a mere codification conference,
as was the Second United Nations Conference, which produced the short-lived 1958 Geneva Conventions. The representatives of the African nations made it clear from the outset of our endeavours that

so-called customary international law emanating from the European maritime experience could not
juridically form the basis for codification or even progressive development of any law which is
intended to bind us Africans directly. This Convention represents for the first time a truly universal
law and must be seen as such. Any of its features that bear resemblance in content or form to any

custom or agreements or treaties recognized by any region or sub-region or among maritime nations
sharing common interests must be viewed as purely coincidental.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 61/PV.185 (1983).
76. Convention, supra note 10, art. 311.
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the nature of the undertaking in the Conference, when many of the 1958 provisions were transferred, essentially intact, into the new Treaty.
Second, it makes no sense to embark on any other course. It is clear that it is in
the national interest of all states, coastal or otherwise, to see to it that global patterns emerge reflecting a careful balance of interests between the coastal states and
the maritime powers. For example, it would not be in the interests of archipelagic
states to favor a regime that would not promote global recognition by all states,
whether parties to the Convention or not, of the archipelagic principle. That
would place them in only a slightly improved position compared to the pretreaty
situation. By the same token, the problem of passage through international straits
is so universal, affecting in a direct way the interests of both the maritime states
and the littoral states, that only a uniformly recognized and applied set of rules
could be conceivable. These rules reflect the practice of states,7 7 and these are the
rules expressed by the Treaty. It boggles the mind to think that any other practice
could be acceptable at this point in history, nor is it conceivable that rational,
reflective decisionmaking could lead to a contrary conclusion.
While legal scholars, shielded from the ugly glare of international reality, may
enjoy further debate on the constitution of customary international law, the reality
of navigation in modern history and its importance, politically as well as in terms
of global strategic considerations, dictates that the nonmining provisions of the
Treaty control the actions of states by universal recognition and application.
Finally, some have argued that the provisions in question should be applied
with respect to signaorizes to the Treaty without respect to ratification, but not
otherwise. Perhaps this argument is based upon some emanations from the
Vienna Convention. 7 8 But a distinction of this nature is basically specious. The
position of a state which has signed but not ratified, and a state which has done
neither, carries no different implications with respect, say, to the financial obligations under Part XI of the Treaty. Neither such state has accepted them. What is
the basis, therefore, of distinguishing between them with respect to navigational
rights? Furthermore, what state bordering constricted waters would wish to place
itself in the politically difficult position of applying different norms to different
maritime users based on such a slim distinction? To do so, it would appear, would
create potential political and diplomatic problems of immense proportions and
unacceptable consequences which can easily be avoided to the general benefit of
all. One of the major advantages of the negotiated provisions relating to navigation is that they relieve coastal states from the need to make such decisions,
thereby setting off one maritime user against another, or, for that matter, causing
conflict between neighbors, a situation that could be even more troublesome.
For such reasons, I am optimistic that the international community, in its
wisdom and realism, will prefer to opt for general application of the navigation
and overflight provisions reflected in the Treaty. One need only look to past experience to verify the advantage to be attained. The 1958 Geneva Conventions,
77.
78.

See Harlow, Comment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1983, at 125.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (May 22, 1969).
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while not signed 19 by many states participating in the Law of the Sea Conference,
were recognized as valuable, and they were uniformly applied by all signatories to
all states, signatory or not. I see no reason why we should not benefit from the
experience of this wisdom, or why that approach should not now be expected to
continue toward the goal of global stability.

79.

For a list of countries signing the 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 6, see 15 U.S.T. 1606.

